World change and world security. Speech by Roy Jenkins, President Designate of the European Commission, delivered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Bicentennial Lecture Series. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 16 December 1976 by Jenkins, Roy.
european 
community PI~  ESS  I~ 1: LJ:J\5 E 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  INFORMATION  SERVICE 
2100 M Street Northwest, Suite 707, Washington, D.C. 20037 Telephone: (202)  872-8350 
New York Office: 245 East 47th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017 Telephone: (212) 371-3890 
SPEECH  BY  MR.  ROY  JENKINS 
No.  55/1976 
EMBARGO 
December  16,  1976 
20  O'Clock  EST 
14  O'Clock  GMT 
15  O'Clock  GMT  +  1 
PRESIDENT  DESIGNATE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION 
DELIVERED  AT  MIT 
Britain's former  Home  Secretary  Roy  Jenkins,  who  becomes President 
of  the  Commission  of  the European  Communities  on  January  6,  tonight 
addresses  an  audience  at the Massachusetts  Institute for  Technology 
(MIT)  in  Cambridge. 
The  lecture,  entitled "World  Change  and  World  Security," 
focuses  on  EC-US  relations,  internal  Community  problems,  and  the 
Community's  place  in  the world.  It is Jenkins'  first public  statement 
on  these  issues since it was  announced  last July that  Jenkins  would 
become  the next  EC  Commission  President.  (The  text  is attached to 
this release.) 
Mr.  Jenkins brings to the nine-nation  Community's  complex 
economic,  monetary  trade,  and  employment  problems his experience as 
a  reforming  Home  Secretary and,  in 1967-70,  as Britain's Chancellor 
of  the Exchequer. 
In  1972,  Mr.  Jenkins  resigned the  deputy  leadership of the 
Labor Party after it called for  a  referendum on  whether or not 
Britain should  remain  in the  Community.  His  hopes  that the British 
would  vote  a  definite  "Yes"  were  realized,  and  the  55-year old won 
two  major  European  awards  for  campaigning for  West  European unity 
the Charlemagne  Prize  and  the  Schuman  Prize. 
Mr.  Jenkins is the  author of  several political biographies, 
including one  on  the late Labor Prime  Minister Clement  Attlee, 
whose  post-war administration helped build the welfare state in 
Britain. Massachussetts  Institute of  Technology 
Bicentennial Lecture Series 
WORLD  CHANGE  AND  WORLD  SECURITY 
Address  by 
The  Right  Honourable  Roy  Jenkins,  M.P. 
* 
*  * UNITED  STATES  AND  A  UNITED  EUROPE 
ARE  WE  NOW  UNCERTAIN  PARTNERS  ? 
I  come  before  you  tonight  as  a  President-elect. 
Or  perhaps  I  should  say  a  President-designate,  for  my  electoral 
college,  which  is as  small  as  that of  the  Nine  Heads  of Govern-
ment  of the  member  states of  the  European  Community,  does  not 
perhaps entitle me  to  the  status of "elect".  But  in  any  event 
I  am  a  President  - in  - waiting,  and  I  shall assume  office on 
the  6th  of January  next year,  which will give  me  a  start of 
14  days  on  another  much  more  distinguished President-elect. 
There  is little obscurity about  the office of  the  President 
of  the  United States.  But  the  President  of  the  Commission  of 
the  European  Communities  is  a  mysterious  person  in  a  post which 
for  many  in Europe  as  well  as  in the  United States is pretty 
mysterious  too. 
In  the  course of  this  lecture  I  hope  to lift some  of 
the  mystery  both  about  my  own  future  job  and  the  institutions  I 
shall have  the  honour  to represent.  It will not  be  easy.  Indeed 
I  can  hope  to do  little more  than  give  a  kind of photograph, 
taken with  a  short  time  exposure,  of  institutions which  are 
evolving  even  as  we  look at  them.  Already  they  are  the  subject 2. 
of  a  kind  of  folklore  and  have  generated  a  vocabulary which  often 
obscures  rather  than  illustrates.  What  is  a  United  Europe  ?  What 
is the  partnership,  certain or  uncertain,  which it can  be  said 
to have with  the  United States  ?  Can  the  United  States  and  a 
United  Europe  be  regarded as  in  some  way  comparable  ?  What  is their 
future  ?  Have  they  one  ? 
This  is a  lecture of less than  an  hour  rather than  a  semi~ar 
of several days,  and  I  do  not  intend tonight to take  up  more 
than  three  themes  :  some  history about  the  relationship between 
Americans  and Western  Europeans  ;  some  description of the insti-
tutions of the  European  Communities,  and  their direction of growth; 
and  some  thoughts  about  the uncertainties  latent in the relation-
ship between  the  industrial societies  on  each side of the Atlantic. 
Therein  I  shall express  my  own  best hopes  for  the  future. 
This  is a  country  in which  the past has  only relative 
virtue.  Until recently at least,  your  eyes  have  been  more  focusse~ 
on  the  future.  Nevertheless  you  are your  past as  well  as  your 
present,  and  if we  are to  look  forwards  we  have  to  look  backwards 
as well.  The  United States is both  a  product of  European civili-
zation  and  a  reaction against  European  society and politics.  It 
was  created out  of  a  revolt against  one  European  State,  although 
aided  in that process  by  another one.  It was  populated to  a  large 
extent  by  those  who  for  reasons  of poverty,  persecution,  or  lack 
of opportunity,  wished to  shake  the dust of  Europe  off their feet. 
But  only  in  few  cases  was  this accompanied  by  a  desire to get 
their European  heritage out of their minds  and  hearts;  rather it was 
to keep  Europe  as  a  point of reference  in  the  framework  of their 3. 
new  society  and  cherish it while  adapting  and  to  some  extent 
reshaping it in their minds. 
It is not  perhaps  surprising that  one  of  the  basic prin-
ciples of  United States  foreign  policy,  at least until  1917, 
and  to  some  extent well after that,  was  a  desire to avoid  the 
entanglements  and  sophistries of  European  diplomacy  and  conflict. 
Nevertheless  in this century the United States has  fought  two 
world wars,  entering them both reluctantly but  ineluctably,  which 
arose  - the first wholly,  the  second principally - from  European 
causes.  As  a  result of  the  second,  the  position of  the  United 
States  in  the world  was  decisively changed.  Then  began  a  quarter 
century  in which  the  United States had  a  pre-eminence  in the 
world of which  Washington  was  ~ore assuredly its centre  than  any 
capital since  the  fall of ancient  Rome.  In  these  post-war years 
the  United States held the political balance of the whole  world 
and  on  the whole  welcomed  the  task.American withdrawal  in the  1920s 
had  greatly damaged  hopes  for  any  long-term peace.  Such  a  withdrawal 
in the  1940s,  50s,  60s  would  have  been still more  disastrous.  It 
would  have  meant  a  fundamental  shift in the  balance of  power 
towards  the  Soviet  Union.  It is no  wonder  that at that time  the 
support of  the  United States  became  essential to the  continued 
independence  and  prosperity of Western  Europe,  that most  vulnera-
ble peninsula at the near  end  of Asia. 
It is likewise no  wonder  that the  United States  should 
have  become  an  early,  enthusiastic and  even  impatient  supporter 
of the  process  of  European  economic  and political integration. 4 . 
Many  needs  and  motives  pushed  the  United  States  in this direction: 
- First there was  the  understandable desire to avoid 
any  repetition of what  had  happened  in  1917  and  1941. 
Anything that the  Europeans  could do  to put an  end  for  ever 
to their civil wars  which  had  so devastatingly  involved the 
world  in  general  and  the United States in particular was 
obviously  a  prime  American  interest. 
Secondly the Americans  had their own  inner faith in the 
advantages  of union,  of  federal institutions,  of what 
could  be  forged  from  the heat engendered by  the mingling 
of peoples,  traditions,  customs  and  ways  of life.  In 
short many  Americans  saw  a  union  of  European States on 
the  same  lines as  the union  they  had made  for  themselves. 
- Thirdly there was  the understandable  feeling that the 
Europeans  should organise themselves  to use  as co-opera-
tively and  effectively as  possible the massive  American 
economic  aid which  was  so generously provided after the end 
of  the last war. 
- Finally there was  the strongfeeling,  as  strong today 
as  ever,  that if the United States was  to take the risk 
of military  involvement  in the defence of Europe,  the 
Europeans  should organise  themselves  to make  the biggest and 
most  effective contribution of their own  that they could. 5. 
From  1950  or  even earlier it was  therefore  a  settled 
object of  United States policy to encourage  moves  towards  the 
integration  of  Western  Europe.  The  recently published  memoirs  of 
Jean  Monnet  are  studded with  the  names  of distinguished Americans, 
and  not  only  the most  obvious  ones  who  were  Presidents  and 
Secretaries of State,  but  men  such  as  Jack  McCloy,  George  Ball, 
Bob  Bowie  who  were  all closely and  intensively  involved  in this 
most  creative period of European  development. 
It was  not  easy.  Sometimes  the  Americans  pushed  harder 
than  the Europeans,  and  in directions  in which  the  Europeans  did 
not  want  to  go.  Thus  American  desire  for  early  German  rearmement 
at one  time  endangered the setting up  of  the  Coal  and  Steel Com-
munity,  and  this danger was  circumvented only  at  the  price of 
setting off down  what  became  the  dead  end  of  the  European  Defence 
Community.  Much  later the project for  a  Multinational Nuclear 
Force  also proved  an  unfortunate  diversion. 
But I  mettion  these  exceptions  only to  prove  the  rule  : 
the  consistency of  United States support  for  the European  idea. 
It is in  some  ways  paradoxkalthat what  was  - and  is  - an  essentially 
political enterprise should have  been  pursued by  largely economic 
means.  This  has  simply  been  because it proved easier to make  the  Coal 
and  Steel Community  and  then  the  European  Economic  Community  than  to 
make  a  European  Defence  Community  or  a  European  Political Community. 
But  we  should not  be  deceived.  The  European  founding  fathers  -6. 
Robert  Schuman,  Adenauer,  de  Gasperi,  Paul-Henri  Spaak  - were 
always  more  interested in politics than  they  were  in  products 
and  markets.  They  might  have  echoed  the  sentiments  of  Gladstone 
when  in his thirties he  became  Vice-President  of the  Board  of 
Trade  : 
I  wished to concern  myself  with  the great affairs of  men, 
and  insteadhere  I  am  set to  look  after packages. 
But  the  Europeans  made  a  good  job of  looking after packages, 
and  soon  realised that the  loom  of trade made  a  tissue which 
included supranationality,  and  itself became,  as it remclins  today, 
one  of  the  great affairs of men. 
This  point was  perhaps better understood  in  the  United 
States than  in  Europe  itself.  Quite often moves  towards  economic 
integration were  against the  short term trading interests of the 
United States,  although the  immense  growth  over  the period of 
wealth  and  stability of the  European  market  benefited world  trade 
and 
in general/therefore the  United States.  Happily  for  us all,  there was 
almost  invariably  in Washington  a  willingness not  only  to take 
a  long-term economic  view but also to see that the political 
advantages  of  having  stable,  prosperous  and  united allies far out-
weighed  any  short-term economic  inconveniences. 7. 
Then  there  was  the  problem of  Britain.  Was  Europe  to 
consist of the  Six or of  a  larger number?  In  the  1950s  and 
60s  the  debate  in Britain was  about whether British relations 
with  the  countries of the  Continent should be  more  akin  to  those 
of the  United States with  them or to their own  with  each  other. 
The  attitude of both  the Attlee  Government  and of  the  second 
Churchill  Government which  followed,  thus  spanning the crucial 
decade  1945-1955,  was  firmly  in  favour  of  an  American  style 
relationship.  Ernest Bevin,  Foreign  Secretary in  the  Attlee 
Government,  was  one  of the architects of the  North Atlantic 
Treaty,  but kept Britain out of the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community.  Anthony  Eden,  Foreign Secretary in the  second 
Churchill  Government,  tried to encourage  the  creation of  a 
European  Defence  Community without Britain  (although eventually 
committing British troops to Germany  for the  rest of the  century), 
and  tragically declined to be  represented at the Messina  Conference 
which  led directly to the  Treaty of  Rome.  These  were  the  days, 
much  more  than  in the  20s  and  30s,  when  the British saw  themselves 
as  the  meeting point of three circles:  the  Commonwealth,  the  North 
Atlantic,  and  Europe. 
This  view of ourselves,  however  understandable  at  the 
time,  represented  a  gross  over-estimate of British power  and 
British options,  and  turned out to be  a  source  of misjudgment 
and  misfortune  for ourselves  and  our allies.  It might  have  been 8. 
expected  that these  illusions would  have  been  punctured by  the 
failure  of  the  Suez  adventure  of  twenty  years  ago  this autumn, 
and  to have  led  to  the  abandonment  of  the  idea that we  were  a 
kind of  mini  United States off the  coast of Europe.  We  might 
thus  have  moved  towards  Europe  itself.  This  may  have  been  the 
effect in  the  longer  term.  But in the  shorter one  the  failure 
of  Suez  affected the  two  countries  most  concerned  - Britain 
and  France  - very differently. 
The  British,  chastened  and  a  little guilty,  drew  the 
conclusion  that however  unhelpful  Secretary Dulles 
and even  President Eisenhower  might  have  been,  the  main  lesson 
to be  drawn  was  that no  more  enterprises were  to be  attempted 
without  the  assured support of Britain's principal ally. 
Hilaire Belloc's words:  "keep  a-hold of nurse,  for  fear of 
finding  something worse"  became  for  most  of the  next  decade 
Britain's motto  for dealing with the  United States.  At  the 
beginning there  was  even  some  attempt  to give  new  life to the 
old special relationship;  but by  the  end nurse  had  become  too 
preoccupied with her  own  affairs  and  too  bespattered by  the 
dirt of Vietnam  to  give  even  starched reassurance. 
In  France  the  reaction was  quite different.  There  was 
less guilt and  more  anger.  The  lesson  drawn  there  was  not  to 
trust  the  Americans  and  probably not  the British either.  When 
General  de  Gaulle  came  to  power  18  months  later, this turned 
into an  intransigent but  successful pursuit of French  inde-
pendence,  with  "the Anglo-Saxons"  (that curious mythical  people) 9. 
kept  as far  as possible at  arms'  length. 
This  conjunction  of Gaullism in  France  and  Macmillanism 
in  Britain created delicate  temptations  for  the  United States. 
There  was  of  course  the  temptation  to  play  one  off against  the 
other.  There  was  also the  more  subtle  temptation to abandon 
faith  in  the  idea of  a  united Europe  and  work  bilaterally 
through  the  individual  European  governments.  On  the  whole 
these  temptations  were  resisted.  Of  course  some  bilateralism 
continued,  as  it still does,  and is bound  to do  so  long  as 
European  institutions  remain  imperfect.  But  no-one  doubted 
that the  Americans  wanted  both the  enlargement  and  the  strengthen-
ing of the  European  Community.  Knowledge  that this was  so was 
deeply  reassuring to  those  who  like myself  had  the  same  beliefs. 
Even  those  opposed had  to  reckon with it.  This point is well 
illustrated by  the  fact  that when  Hugh  Gaitskell,  then  leader 
of the  Opposition  in Britain,  made  what  I  regard  as  the  one 
major  misjudgment of his career and  opposed British entry into 
the  Community  in 1962,  he  thought it necessary to write  in his 
own  hand  a  13-page letter of  justification to John  Kennedy. 10. 
He  did what  he  believed  to be  right,  but he  knew it would 
in  Washington 
not  be well  receivedjand  thought  he  had  better explain 
himself. 
Those  anxious  and  disagreeable days  are done. 
The  European  Community  now  comprises  both  the original Six 
and  the  new  Three,  including Britain,  who  joined in  1973. 
I  now  want  to  say  a  word  about that Community  and 
its institutions,  and  the  way  in which  they  are evolving. 
Before  doing  so  I  give  a  warning.  As  I  have  already said, 
it is extremely  easy  for  Americans,  particularly in their 
Bicentenmal  Year,  to  see  an  analogy  between  the United 
States of  America  and  the  uniting states of  Europe.  This 
is  a  temptation which  should,  I  believe,  be  resisted:  not 
because  there is nothing  in it, but because it can  lead,  like 
many  historical and political analogies,  to misleading 
hopes  and  expectations.  In this year of  1976,  Americans 
have  probably  thought more  about their origins  than at any 
time  for  a  century,  and  have  better separated the fact  from 
the  fantasy  of what  happened  two  hundred  years  ago.  As  much 
by  inadvertence  as  by  deliberate intent,  and with many  deep 
misgivings,  a  group of  remote  colonists,  united by  language, 
custom  and  the  land  on which  they  lived,  threw off the 
authority of  a  mother  country which was  itself divided  by 
the constitutional  issues at stake.  The  new  country  thus 
begun  had  more  than  a  century  in which  to develop  in 11. 
relative peace,  protected for  the  most part by  the British 
Navy  from  uncomfortable  involvement  in the affairs of the 
rest of  the world. 
Contrast this with  the origins of the  European 
Community.  The original Six  had  one  unhappy  thing in 
common:  they  had all been  defeated,  and  in many  cases 
devastated,  in war.  They  had  also been  forcibly united 
for  four  awful  years  under  the domination of Adolf  Hitler. 
Their first thought was  to unite  to prevent at all costs 
a  third  European civil war.  But as  their prosperity re-
turned,  they  became  more  conscious  of their historical 
roots,  their different languages,  habits of  thought  and 
way  of  life.  The  recovery of  Europe  as  a  whole  meant  a 
recovery  in  the  self-confidence of  the participating 
states.  Thus  what  happened  was  in  a  way  the reverse of 
what  happened  in America.  Suppose  that Massachusetts  had 
been  the  only British part of America,  a.1d  that New  Jersey 
had  been  Dutch,  Rhode  Island Flemish,  v{rginia German, 
Georgia  French  and  Maryland  Italian,  and  that each  had 
proudly retained  the  traditions of its homeland,  how 
difficult,  if not  impossible,  would  have  been  the elaboration 
of  a  federal  constitution of  anything  like the kind  which 
was  eventually established.  This  very diversity is one of 
the riches of  Europe;  but it has  required  looser,  differen~ 
mechanisms  which  cannot readily be  compared  with your  own. 12. 
The  constitution of  the  European  Communities 
is  the Treaty of  Rome  as  subsequently  amended.  This 
constitution represents  a  balance  between  respect for 
the  powers  of  the  member  states and  the grant of  a  limited 
measure  of  supranationality  in  economic  and  judicial 
matters  to  the  institutions of  the Communities.  Four 
main  institutions were  set up.  I  shall have  something 
to  say  about  each of  them. 
First there  is the  Commission  of which  I  am  to 
be  President.  It is the executive  body of  the Communities 
and  is responsible for  ensuring  that the principles of 
the  Treaty  are observed  and  for  initiating proposals  for 
adoption  by  representatives of member  states sitting 
together  as  the Council.  In proportion to its responsi-
bilities the  Commission  is very  small:  some  10,000 people 
of which  about  a  third are concerned with interpretation 
and  translation.  At  its head  are thirteen Commissioners, 
two  each  from  Germany,  France,  Italy and  Britain,  and  one 
from  each of  the other members.  They  are  chosen  by  member 
by  common  accord 
governments/but each  has  to  swear  an oath to be  guided 
only  by  the  European  interest rather  than  that of  his 
own  country.  Their decisions are  by  majority vote. 
Then  there  is the Council,  the principal decision-
making  body  which  is responsible  for  co-ordination of  the 
general  economic  policies of member  states.  The  Council 13. 
consists of  representatives of each member  government, 
and  the chairmanship moves  from  one  countrv  to another 
every  six months.  All  important decisions  are  by  unanimity. 
The  Commission  and  the Council  are  placed  in  a  state of 
what  has  been  appropriately called creative  tension. 
Next  there is the  European  Parliament which  has 
advisory  and  supervisory  powers,  and meets  eleven  times 
a, year  for  about  a  week  at  a  time.  Its committees  also 
meet  between Sessions.  At  present it consists of members 
designated  by  parliaments  of  member  states,  but the  firm 
intention is that elections to  the  Parliament will be  by 
direct universal  suffrage  from  1978  onwards.  This  will  be 
only  26  years  after  t~e creation of  the first Community  -
the  Coal  and  Steel Community  - whereas it took  the United 
States  136  years  to achieve  them  for  the Senate.  The 
Parliament gives opinions  on  proposals of  the Commission, 
debates  the activities of  the Community,  and  reviews  a 
general  report submitted  annually to it by  the  Commission. 
More  important is its power  to review  the  annual  budget  and 
to  compel  the  resignation of  the thirteen members  of  the 
Commission. 
Finally there is  the Court of Justice,  composed 
of  nine  judges  appointed  for  six-year  terms  by  common 
accord of  the  member  states.  The  primary  function  of 14. 
the  European  Court  is to  ensure respect  for  the Treaty 
and  interpret the  law  of  the Community.  Its  judgments 
are  legally binding  throughout  member  states,  and  can 
over-ride national  law  and  bring  national states to  book. 
Not  so well-known  are  the  powers  of  the Court  to guarantee 
or  improve  the  position of  individuals,  and  protect 
fundamental  human  rights. 
Beside  these  four  pillars of  the  European  Communities  -
the  Commission,  the Council,  the  Parliament  and  the Court  -
has  grown  up  another  more  flexible  institution outside 
the  scope of  the  Treaty.  This  is European po1itical 
co-operation,  and  represents  an attempt  to co-ordinate 
the  foreign  policies of  the  Nine  member  states  towards 
the outside world.  It has  no  permanent  staff and  its 
secretariat  simply consists of  national officials which 
change  every  six months  with  the  chairmanship.  Thus  the 
caravan moves  from  capital to capital of  the Community. 
Nevertheless  this is a  field  in which  considerable progress 
has  recently  been  made.  As  one  example,  unanimity  amongst 
the  Nine  has  been  achieved  in over  80  % of votes at the 
United  Nations.  You  will recall  that the  attempt  to create 
a  European  Defence  Community  failed,  but that  the  European 
Economic  Community  succeeded.  European political 
co-operation  is perhaps  the  embryo  of  the  European 
Political Community  without which  the  European  Union, 
to which  member  states eventually  look  forward,  could 
have  no  meaning. 15. 
These  institutions  have  filled  their  functions 
unevenly  over  the years.  As  a  bureaucracy  the  Commission 
has  had  its successes  and  its failures.  What  is not  always 
understood is the  extent to  which it has  been  the  protector 
of  the  weaker  member  states against  the  stronger ones.  It 
is in fact  the  instrument of  the Community,  and  the  means 
by  which its policies are put  into effect,  whether,  for 
example,  the  common  agricultural policy,  the  common 
commercial  policy,  or anti-trust legislation.  It is like-
wise  the  manager  of vast  funds,  those  required  for directing 
the  agricultural market,  and  the  Regional  and  Social Funds, 
both of  them  redistributive of wealth  between  the different 
parts of  the  Community  in intent and  effect.  Finally it 
provides  an  administrative  framework  for  the coordination 
of  the  economic  and  monetary  policies of  the participating 
states.  It will be  evident that its possibilities for  growth, 
as  common  action is called for  in  new  fields,  is theoretically 
limitless,  but it is at once  the  creature of  the  Treaty  and 
the  servant of  the Council.  Needless  to  say it comes  into 
conflict  from  time  to  time  with  the  member  governments, 
which  like all governments,  are  jealous of  their  powers. 
Hence  the  importance  of  the  Council  where  the 
Commission  proposes  and  the  Council  disposes.  The  Council 16. 
meets  at the  level of Ministers of  Foreign Affairs,  but 
there are specialist Councils  as well,  where  such Ministers 
as  those of  Agriculture,  Finance or  the Environment  can 
come  together. 
Recently  summit meetings  of  Heads  of  Government 
of  the  Community  have  taken place on  a  regular basis and 
are  known,somewhat  confusingly,  as  European Councils. 
The  advantages  of  such meetings  are obvious,  but the 
disadvantages  less  so.  European Councils  provide an 
all too  convenient means  for Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
not  to  take  the decisions  themselves  but to refer  them  to 
their  Heads  of  Government;  and  so  far  the  Heads  of 
Government  meetings  have  often been  too  informal  to 
produce  the  real results  now  required of  them.  Whether 
for  this  reason  or  for others  the  normal  Councils  have 
in  the  last  few  years  lost some  of  the  impetus,  the accommodating 
spirit,  the readiness  to  take decisions which  characterised 
the  Councils  of  the first  few  years  in  the life of the 
Community.  The  requirement of  unanimity  on all matters 
of  importance  has  laid an  inevitably deadening  hand. 
If the  Commission  has  sometimes  been  too  bureau-
cratic and  the  Council  too mindful  of  national interests, 
the  Parliament,  t~rough no  fault of its own,  has  not 
yet  succeeded  in achieving  adequate  power  of democratic 17. 
control.  I  believe  that the  recent  agreement  on  direct 
elections  by  universal  suffrage will  eventually give  the 
Parliament  a  new  and  different role,  although direct 
elections will not  mean  any  formal  increase  in  powers. 
Parliaments  have  always  been  keenly  interested  in the 
problems  of  financial  supply  and  control of  the  budget. 
The  role of  the  European  Parliament  in  helping  us  to 
tackle  the  problems  which  now  face  the  Community  - from 
the  size and  purposes  of  the  budget  to the  lack of  economic 
balance  between  the  member  states  - may  prove  to  be  crucial. 
But  again it will not  be  easy.  National  parliaments  are 
in  no  hurry  to  give  up  their powers;  and  a  whole  new 
balance of democratic  power  within  the  Community  will 
eventually have  to  be  established. 
Finally in this section  a  word  on  the  European 
Court.  Here  there are  remarkable  possibilities for  growth. 
The  powers  of  the Court are more formidable  because it 
is in effect,  although  international,  a  judicial organ 
of  each member  state and  its decisions  are directly enforoeable 
The  implications  go  very far  for  those  used  to the doctrine 
of absolute parliamentary sovereignty  - which  is particularly 
so  in Britain,  where  the  somewhat  extreme position of  Dicey 
has  long  held  sway.  To  take  one  example,  an  individual 
could  invoke its decisions  on  equal  pay  for  equal  work 
if he  found  that British legislation on  these points did 18. 
not  go  as  far  as  that of  the  Treaty of  Rome.  I  think 
that  even  Americans,  used  to  their own  Supreme  Court, 
would  be  startled by  the potential powers  of  the 
European  Court.  The  best American  analogy  would  be  to 
have  the  Equal  Rights  Amendment  automatically  becoming 
part of  the  law  of  the  United  States  by  virtue of  a 
judgment  of  the  International Court  of  Justice at The  Hague. 
In  due  course  the  European  Court  may  play as  formative 
a  part in the history of  Europe  as Marshall's  Supreme 
Court played  in  the  early/middle history of  the United 
States. 
It will be clear  from all  I  have  said that 
although  the  European  Community  in its various  aspects 
has  economic,  political and  judicial reality,  it is very 
far  from  complete.  Moreover  the  relationship between  the 
Community  and  its member  states is constantly shifting.  It 
would  also,  I  am  afraid,  be  a  mistake  to  think that the 
construction of  the  Community  may  be  slaw but is always 
advancing.  I  do  not  think that any  part has'yet been 
demolished,  or  that work  in this area or that has  been 
more  than  blocked.  But  the  Community  has  faced,  and  now 
faces,  very  serious  problems. 
Tonight  I  shall mention only  one  of  them:  the 
economic  capacities of  the  member  states,  far  from  reaching 19. 
a  rough  equivalence,  have  recently  become  more  markedly 
divergent  than  ever before.  Four  years  ago  the  small 
countries  feared  the dominance  of  the  four  large ones: 
Germany,  France,  Britain and  Italy.  Two  years  later 
there  was  fear of  two  large countries:  Germany  and  France. 
Now  Germany  is alone  in  a  position quite different  from 
the others.  A  number  of ideas are under discussion  for 
righting  a  disequilibrium which  no  one wants,  least of 
all the  Germans.  All  these  ideas  would if applied require 
discipline  and  sacrifice on  the part of those who  have 
dropped  behind.  I  do  not  know  whi-ch will be  adopted. 
But  I  do  know  that if this  fundamental  problem is not 
faced  the effect will be  that of  an earth tremor  on  a 
half built house. 
It would  be  tempting  for  the  United States  to 
think it better to  leave  the  Europeans  to put their affairs 
in order  and  develop  the  new  institutions which  I  have 
described,  and deal  for  the  time  being with  the  familiar 
governments of the  member  states.  It is not  necessarily 
easy  to  conduct  business with an  institution which  so 
evidently  has  scaffolding still round  it, when  fierce 
argument  comes  from  within,  where  parts  seem half built 
and  others half used,  where  the  telephone  system  does 
not  seem  to be  fully  installed,  and  where  sometimes  even 
essential services  do  not  seem  to be  laid on.  Yet  this 20. 
would  be  a  great mistake.  At  least most  of  the building 
is  in  good  working  order,  and  is stronger  than it some-
times  looks.  And  the  view  from  the  top,  to which  men  of 
vision occasionally mount,  reveals  far  horizons. 
I  do  not want  to  numb  you with  figures  but  one 
or  two  statistics about  the Community  and  the states which 
comprise it will give  you  an  idea of its scope  and potentiali-
ties.  In  1975  the  total population was  just short of 
260 million,  against  212  million for  the United States 
and  110 million  for  Japan.  Its gross  domestic  product 
was  $  1,362 billion against  $  1,505 billion for  the 
United  States  and  $  491  billion for  Japan.  The  volume  of 
its imports  (excluding  trade  among  its members)  was 
$  155  billion against  $  97  billion for  the United States 
and  $  58  billion for  Japan;  and  the  volume  of its exports 
(also excluding  trade  among  member  states)  was  $  150 billion 
against  $  108  billion for  the United  States and  $  56  billion 
for  Japan.  Thus  you will see at a  glance that the  European 
Community  comprises  an  immense  population,  a  gross domestic 
product  almost  as  great as  that of  the United States,  and 
a  volume  of  imports  and  exports  which  make  it decisively 
the  largest trading unit in  the  world. 21. 
No  wonder  that Governor  Carter recently wrote: 
"United States-European  relations is at  the  heart 
of u.s.  foreign policy.  In  economic  policy,  their 
cooperation with  each other and with  Japan  is 
necessary both to their prosperity and  to the 
progress of developing countries;  growing European 
unity can  help  to fulfil  this promise." 
He  later added: 
"Europe will be better able  to fulfil its role  in 
US-European-Japanese  cooperation in  the  degree  that 
it can  speak with  one  voice  and  act with one will. 
The  United States has  sometimes  seemed to encourage 
European  unification with words,  while prefering to 
deal with national governments  in practice.  I  believe 
that we  should deal  with  Brussels on  economic  issues 
to the extent that the  Europeans  themselves  make 
Brussels  the  focus  of their decisions." 
I  much  welcome  these words.  They  represent  a  challenge 
to  the  institutions of the  Community  and  the  Member  States to 
rise  above  their various national  problems  and difficulties, 
and  to negotiate with the  strength which  only  unity can  give  • 
them.  The  European  Community  is more  than  the  sum of its parts; 
and it is generous  as well  as  sensible of the  new  United States 
President to  have  given  the  Europeans  the encouragement  he  now  has. 22. 
I  say  sensible  as  well  as  generous  because  the  Commu-
nity,  with all its imperfections,  is gradually  asserting 
greater weight  and  authority  in  the  world.  In  Europe  itself 
the  community  has  acted as  a  political as  well  as  an  economic 
magnet.  The  Six original members  were  joined by  the Three  nearly 
four  years  ago.  Around  this central nucleus  is  a  web  of 
association  agreements with all the  free  countries of Europe. 
Greece  is  now  negotiating  for  membership,  and Portugal is not 
far behind.  Spain  may  follow,  and  also Turkey.  The  Community 
has  also  drawn  closer to such  countries  as  Yugoslavia  and  those 
on  the  Southern  and  Eastern  shores  of the  Mediterranean,  and 
through its mechanisms  of political cooperation is engaged in 
a  dialogue  with  the  Arab world,  where it has still greater 
economic  interests than  the  United States.  It is in the process 
of working out new  economic  relations with the  countries of 
Eastern  Europe  and  the Soviet Union,  and of course played  a 
major  role  in the  Conference  on  Security and  Cooperation in 
Europe,  which  led to that charter of hope  for all Europeans  on 
either side of the post-war dividing  line:  the  Helsinki  Declaration. 
Looking  beyond  the  frontiers of Europe  we  can  see  the 
network of agreements with the  49  African,  Caribbean  and other 
countries  comprised  in  the  Lome  convention.  The  Community  thus 
has  an  intimate institutional relationship with  a  large number 
of countries  in  the  third world,  and  is the  source  of more  trade .23. 
and  aid  than  the  United States itself.  Looking still further 
afield, it has  a  particular relationship with the  Chinese 
People's  Republic,  which  was  the  first c:ommunist  country to 
accredit  an  ambassador  to  the  Community  in Brussels. 
I  need hardly say that  t.'1e  very  success of the  Community 
and its members  in  the  fields  I  have  described is of vital 
concern  to the  United States.  It means  that the Europeans 
have  been  taking on  an  increasingly important part of the  burden 
of responsibility for  the  maintenance  and  development of the 
democratic  industrial society we  have  in  common.  It means  that 
in  the  eyes  of  the  third world  there is more  than  one  source of 
western  power,  and  that on  the international  as  on  the  national 
scale we  practice what  we  preach  about plurality of choice.  I 
do not  deny  that in another sense  the  growing weight  of the 
European  Community  can  complicate life  for  the  United  States by 
adding  a  new  dimension  of difficulty and  argument,  and  by bringing 
new  and  sometimes  divergent  interests into play.  But  I  have  no 
doubt  that when  these  considerations  are  weighed  against each 
other the balance  is overwhelmingly positive  for  the  united States. 
The  world  can  now  be  a  less  lonely place  for  a  country with  the 
power  and  responsibilities  of America. 
I  have  not so tar spoken  of  the  problems  of defence. 
Like  the  Pope  the  Commission  nas  no  divisions.  Nevertheless 
the  defence of Europe  cannot  be  dissociated  from  the  recovery 24. 
of  Europe  and  the  growth  of the  new  European  institutions. 
I  have  already  referred to the  failure  of  the  proposal  for  a 
European  Defence  Community  in the  1950s;  and  there  are cf 
course  many  practical objections to reviving  such  an  idea now. 
Perhaps  the  fundamental  point is that the  proper unit of  defence 
is not Western  Europe  or  the  Europe  of  the  Community  but the 
North Atlantic area as  a  whole.  Western  defence  is at present 
organised  in  a  way  which  respects  the specifically European  as 
well  as  the broadly Atlantic  aspect.  Thus  there is our  joint 
membership  of the North Atlantic Treaty,  a  more  restricted 
membership  of that strictly practical European  defence  association 
the  Euro-Group,  and  the still more  restricted membership  of  the 
Western  European  Union which  involves its seven signatories  in 
the  most  binding  commitment  into which  any  state can enter:  an 
/It 
automatic  commitment  to mutual  defence.is  much  tighter than  the 
North  Atlantic Treaty.  If these perspectives  are  to change, 
and  change  they  may  in  the  years  to come,  I  think that the main 
agent of  change will be  the  need  for  the  Europeans  to integrate 
their own  defence  industries,  to standardize equipment  among 
themselves  and  within  the  Alliance,  and  to establish  a  more  even 
partnership,  each making  its due  contribution,  with the  United 
States. 
The  more  powerful  the  European  Community  becomes,  the 25. 
greater its capacity to be  a  worthy  partner of  the  United States. 
This  is as  true  in the  realm of defence  as  it is in  any  other. 
The  converse  is equally true.  If the  Community  were  to fall 
apart  and  the national states were  to  go  their separate ways, 
the  capacity of  the  Europeans  to contribute to the  common  defence 
and play the  greater role which  should surely  come  to  them over 
the years  would  be  gravely prejudiced.  NATO  came  before  the 
Community,  but  I  doubt very  much  whether it could  now  survive 
the  disintegration of the  Community.  And  the  Community's 
relationship with countries at present outside its bounds  - with 
Greece,  Turkey,  Spain  and  Portugal in particular- can  have 
considerable  impact  on  the political orientation of those  countries. 
So  far  the partnership across  the Atlantic has  been 
unequal.  In  many  respects it remains  so.  To  that extent it 
remains  an  uncertain partnership,  one  with  immense  possibilities 
for  the  future  but one  which  could still go  wrong. 
I  deal  first with the  economic  aspects.  Here  there is  a 
very  lopsided balance of trade  in  favour  of  the  United States.  This 
is not  perhaps  surprising.  Unlike  the  Community  the  United States is 
self-sufficient in  most  raw materials  and does  much  less trade 
with  the  outside world.  The  American  consumer  tends  to buy  American 
more  than  the  European  consumer  buys  European.  And  foreign 26. 
competition  is more  deeply  embedded  in  our  home  market  than 
it is  in yours.  Moreoever  we  manage  our agricultural market 
in  a  different way,  and  in certain cases  give  preference 
to agricultural  products  from  the  countries with which  the 
community  has  institutional  links or  come  under  the Generalised 
Preference  Scheme. 
Never theless  the  United  States has  an  enormous  trade  surplus 
with  the  Corr~unity  (in  1975  it was  over  US  $  6  billion and  in 
1976  will probably  run  to over  US  $  7  billion).  Even  in the 
field of agriculture alone  the  United States had  a  surplus of 
US  $  4.5  billion in  1975.  That  is hardly  a  picture of  a 
trading relationship with  a  protectionist Europe.  There  has 
been,  is,  and  I  imagine  is always  likely to be,  some  commercial 
friction between  such giant  economic entities as  the  United 
States  and  the  Community;  but  I  hope  some  of  the  issues over which 
our  negotiators  contend will  find  their solution in the Multi-
lateral Trade  Negotiations which  we  would  like to see  completed 
by  the  end  of  next year.  Certainly if we  even  got  near  to  a 
trade  war  with  each other  there  could  be  only  one  certain result: 
great damage  to  us  bot~  and  in  the  present fragile state of 
world  trade,  great  damage  to  the world  as  a  whole.  Let  us  have 
greater mutual  understanding.  Trading  means  buying  as  well  as 
selling,  and  in  a  political as well  as  an  economic  perspective 
a  grossly  unequal  balance of trade is not  in the  long  run 
tolerable  to either partner across-the Atlantic. Z7. 
It is  sometimes  said that the  Communtiy  is an  economic 
giant but  a  political dwarf.  This  is half-true,  but only  to 
the extent that the  Europeans  make  it so.  The  United States, 
I  suspect,  sees  no Political Community  in Europe  in  the  way 
that is sees  an  Economic  Community.  This  is illustrated by 
the  fact  that the  limited and  strictly economic  term 
Common  Market  is almost  invariably used  in this country. 
You  may  notice  that  I  have  not  used it once  this evening. 
That is at once  natural  and  purposeful  for  me.  There  is 
of course  a  Common  Market  in  Europe.  But  there  is an  attempt  at, 
and  half  a  reality of,  something much  deeper,  and  that mixture 
of reality and  aspiration is far better expressed  by  the  term 
European  Community.  I  hope  that phrase will pass  into wider  use 
in  this country,  for  phrases  have  a  power  that is more  than 
purely desciptive.  And  it would  be  ironical  and  perverse 
if leaders  of  United  States opinion,  which  for  a  generation 
has  been  attracted by  the political  unity  of  Europe,  were 
now  to discount that aspect of  the enterprise.  So  long  as  the 
Economic  Community  is a  flourishing  concern,  there  is  a  certain 
logic driving its members  towards  at least political co-
operation and  perhaps  one  day  a  Political  Community;  but if the 
Economic  Community  looks  sick  and  the  economics  of its member 
states diverge,  so  the machinery  of political co-operation 
looks  sick too,  and  co-operation,  let alone  anything more 
ambitious,  becomes  increasingly hard  to attain. 28. 
In  this respect  I  would  like to make  a  simple plea  to 
Europeans  and  ffinericans  alike.  It is that President Carter's 
words  to  the effect  that Europe  would  be  better able  to fulfil 
its role if it could  speak with one  voice  and  act with one will 
should  be  heeded  by  all.  I  include Americans  in my  plea  because 
if the  United  States  searches  for  one  European voice  and  one 
European will,  it will  be  more  likely to  find  them  than if it 
prefers  to  look  for  nine  European voices  and  nine  European wills. · 
It will  be  interesting to  see  how  the  fort~cming economic  summit 
meeting,  recently  proposed  by  President Giscard d'Estaing of France, 
and  now  widely  supported,  is organised on  the  European  side 
of  the triangle of  United States,  Japan  and  Western  Europe. 
The  words  of  the Gettysburg  address  are  I  suppose  almost 
the most  overworked  in the  American  branch of  the English 
language.  They  could  not  be  quoted  straight.  But  I  am 
occasionally  tempted  to paraphrase  them  into  a  modern  European 
context. 
"Two  decades  and  a  few  years  ago  our  fathers  brought  forth 
upon  this continent  a  new  Community,  conceived  in hope  and 
dedicated  to  the proposition that all European  nations  depend 
for  their strength,  security and  prosperity  upon  each other. 
Now  we  are  engaged  in  a  great trial of will,  testing whether 
that Con®unity  or  any  Community  so  conceived,  can  long  endure." 
We  do  not of  c6urse  have  the  challenge of  a  European civil 
war.  Those  wars  are,  I  hope,  behind  us.  But  we  do  have  the 
threats  of  inertia,  parochialism,  narrow  nationalism and, 29. 
through misplaced  and  unimaginative  caution,  standing still  when 
immobility  is  a  much  greater risk  than  moving  forward.  I 
think  we  can  overcome  these  dangers.  If  I  tmught  otherwise, 
I  would  have  not bave  taken  on  my  new  assignment.  But it 
will be  a  struggle.  Walt  Whitman  wrote  much  nearer  to  the 
Charles  River  than Abraham  Lincoln  spoke. 
"Have  the elder races  faltered, 
Do  they drop  and  end  their  lesson 
Over  there  beyond  the  seas?" 
he  asked  nearly  100  years  ago. 
My  answer  to-day  is  No  .  We  are  engaged  on  an enterprise 
even more  difficult and  complicated  than your  own  two  hundred 
years  ago.  We  need  understanding more  than help,  patience 
more  than pressure to act in ways  which  may  not be  our  own. 
The  result can  be  of vast benefit,  not only  to us  but to  you. 
The  more  equal  the  partnership between  the  United  States  and 
the  uniting states of  Europe  the better for  both,  and  the 
longer it will endure. 